Aerospace systems cannot act reliably on data they cannot verify.

Estimators blend navigation, inertial, magnetic, and environmental inputs into a single state. When one channel degrades quietly, through interference, drift, a failing part, or an inconsistent environment, the blended state degrades with it, and the platform continues acting on a number nothing challenged.

Redundancy answers whether a sensor is present, not whether it is right. Voting schemes need identical channels. Thresholds catch outright failures and miss slow ones. The flight controller cannot audit its own inputs because it is downstream of them.

An independent integrity layer that evaluates residual consistency across sensor channels and outputs source-level health, trust, and fault-state signals to the vehicle stack. It is explainable by design, which is what makes it sellable into civil, commercial, and research programs.

A separate, protected cross-sensor intelligence architecture aimed at defense-oriented applications. Its algorithms, tuning, and implementation are not published, not described here, and are handled only under written agreement.

SWORT does the electronics work itself: flight computer design, GNC hardware, PCB layout, embedded firmware, telemetry, and bench verification. An integrity layer has to be proven against real hardware behaviour, and SWORT builds the hardware it tests against.

Company formed and registered. SSIL architecture defined and separated from protected CSIA work. Causal integrity pipeline implemented, tested, and instrumented, with a native embedded core measured at 247 to 427 ns per tick. Fault-mode coverage extended to six injected scenarios plus a clean baseline, evaluated against 26 recorded flights. Verification formalised as a 41-test automated regression harness, including a test that asserts no lookahead. Software-in-the-loop validation passed against an autonomous mission profile. A commercial integration path committed on a partner platform, and a maintained technical documentation set covering requirements, architecture review, failure modes and effects, and hardware commissioning. Aerospace-electronics engineering capability delivered on customer-funded work.

Hardware-in-the-loop validation on the target flight computer. Each comparator is being calibrated against real sensor noise on the bench rather than the simulator’s noise budget, which is the one step simulation cannot substitute for, followed by instrumented ground and hover runs.

Fault rehearsal on hardware with propulsion disabled, then tethered flight with the layer advisory only. Command authority is enabled last, in simulation first and tethered after, and only once the advisory record supports it. The sequence is deliberate: nothing acts on a vehicle until it has been observed not to cry wolf.